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SOCIAL IMPACTS, POLI TICS, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESSt 
H. PAUL FRIESEMA* and PAULI. CULHANE**
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)' is gener­
ally regarded as the single most important piece of federal legislation 
on the environment. An important feature of NEPA is the require­
ment that administrative agencies prepare environmental impact 
statements (EIS's) for major actions significantly affecting the qual­
ity of the human environment.2 The effectiveness of the EIS require­
ment is open to a great deal of debate. While the EIS is mandated to 
be a multidisciplinary, scientific evaluation of agency proposals,3 a 
host of plaintiffs have alleged that particular EIS's were inadequate, 
and certain scholars have characterized the EIS process as less science 
than "proliferating paperwork."4 At least one environmental lawyer 
has charged environmental statements with "squandering massive 
amounts of time, talent, public and private moneys," and argued that 
EIS's "have little relationship to actual decision making on location, 
design, construction, and operation of the endeavor being studied. 
Often they are done after basic development decisions have been 
made."5 
Perceptions of the ineffectiveness of the EIS process appear to 
result in large part from associating unattainable norms with the EIS 
process. NEPA, the Guidelines of the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), and the normative expectations of agencies' critics 
anticipate EI S's which (a) are scientific and multidisciplinary, (b) 
take into account all relevant factors, (c) evaluate the unquantifiable, 
(d) produce policy which mitigates all damage, and (e) are coordi­
nated with the policy of all other relevant governmental entities. For
students of public administration these prescriptions have a familiar
ring. The study of public administration in the first half of the twen-
tThis article is a revision of a paper originally presented at the Meeting of the Society for 
the Study of Social Problems, Montreal, August 197 4. 
* Associate Professor of Political Science and Urban Affairs, Northwestern University.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Houston.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.
2. NEPA§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
3. NEPA§ 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1970).
4. R. Christofferson, NEPA: Proliferating Paperwork or Plotting a New Direction?,
American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting paper, Philadelphia, 
December 1972. 
5. R. Hansen, speecll to the Colorado Open Spaces Council, Aspen, July 197 4.
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tieth century was dominated by the theory that the bureaucracy 
could be managed in a scientific manner. This scientific management 
theory is perhaps best expressed by Gulick's statement that the job 
of the administrator consists solely of planning, organizing, staffing, 
directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (POSDCORB).6 
During the l 960's scientific management took the form of planning­
programming-budgeting systems (PPB), an attempt to determine 
program expenditures on the basis of cost-benefit evaluation of pro­
grams and program alternatives. 7 The expectation that NEPA will 
cause federal agencies to produce scientific, wholistic, optimizing, 
evaluating, mitigating, and coordinating policy seems to be the latest 
manifestation of the rational decisionmaking perspective on bureau­
cratic behavior. In fact, some scholars would even have NEPA carry 
the burden of technology assessment, the evaluation of whole classes 
of applications of science and engineering.8 
Modem students of public administration have rejected the scien­
tific management perspective on the bureaucracy because bureau­
cratic decisionmaking is not wholistic, but incremental;9 decision­
makers do not optimize, but make the minimum satisfactory 
decision ;1 0 budgeting is not so much a process of rational analysis, as 
PPB advocates argue, as the crux of the political process;1 1 and 
administrative agencies' interactions with each other are not so much 
cooperative as competitive. 1 2 In short, public administrative be­
havior is not scientific management; it is politics. 
It is the contention of this paper that if one evaluates EIS's in 
terms of the quality or even potential quality of the science which is 
brought to bear on environmental policy issues, the evaluation is 
discouraging. However, if one takes a more political perspective, 
NEPA seems to have created a new, complex political process which 
can be and has been used very effectively to improve the social and 
environmental sensitivity of government decisionmakers. 
This article will evaluate the quality of the science found in EIS's 
by focusing on the social impact analysis in environmental state­
ments. NEPA pays at least lip service to the social causes of environ-
6. Gulick, Notes on the Theory of Organization, in Papers on the Science of Administra­
tion (L. Gulick & L. Urwick eds. 1937). 
7. On PPB, see Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management
(F. Lyden & E. Miller eds. 1972). 
8. See Christofferson, supra note 4, and D. Medford, Environmental Harassment or Tech-
nology Assessment? (1973). 
9. C. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Public Ad. Rev. 79-88 (1959).
10. See generally, J. March & H. Simon, Organizations, ch. 6 (1958).
11. A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (1964 ).
12. Holden, "Imperialism" in Bureaucracy, 60 American Pol. Sci. Rev. 943-51 (1966).
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mental problems,1 3 the social impacts of environmental policy,1 4 
and the importance of using social science in environmental planning 
and policymaking. 1 5 Now, five years after NEPA's passage, social 
impacts are becoming increasingly salient aspects of EIS issues. In 
several recent major EIS's, sociocultural issues involving native 
peoples have been the dominant public policy issues, 1 6 and social 
impacts have come to dominate almost every current energy develop­
ment EIS. Additionally, environmental assessment has received 
greatly increased interest from social scientists. The Environmental 
Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association, for 
example, reported a 58 percent growth in membership in the first 
quarter of 197 5 . 1 7 Of course, a basic reason for examining the social 
science in EIS's is that the authors have focused on social impacts in 
their environmental statement work and evaluation of this aspect of 
EIS analysis is within their disciplinary competences. 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENTS AS A DATA BASE 
The authors have, over the past three years, examined EIS's as a 
reflection of the group and administrative processes of natural re­
sources policymaking. Environmental statements have at least three 
methodological advantages as data sources. First, they are written, 
public records of administrative decisionmaking which describe pro­
posals and administrators' justifications for proposals and, on 
occasion, even provide histories of decisionmaking prior to the 
EIS. 1 8 
Second, EIS's are published in draft form, circulated to other 
agencies, interest groups, and individual citizens and specialists for 
comments, and almost always contain those comments in their final 
form. Because of this circulation procedure, EIS's contain a record of 
interagency and interest group conflict and cooperation with respect 
to particular proposals. In addition, commentators often bring out 
clandestine justifications for, or deficiencies of, projects, which elicit 
responses (sometimes superficial) from proposing agencies. Thus, 
13. NEPA § lOl(a), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(A).
14. NEPA § § 10l(b)(2), 10l(b)(4), and 10l(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(B)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 433l(B)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 433l(B)(5) (1970).
15. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1970).
16. See, e.g., the 28 Final Environmental Statements in regard to the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, U.S. Department of the Interior, Alaska Planning 
Group (Washington 1974), and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Crow Ceded Area Coal Lease, Westmoreland Resources Mining Final Environmental State­
ment (Billings, January 29, 1974). 
17. 6 Environmental Sociology 1 (April 1975).
18. On the problem of administrative decisionmaking in relative secrecy, see F. Rourke,
Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemma of Democracy (1961 ). 
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EIS's are an important public adversarial record of administrative 
agency decisionmaking, analogous in many respects to court records 
in litigation and published testimony and debate in legislative 
deliberations. 
A third advantage of the EIS process is that the authors have been 
able to examine it as participant observers. Perhaps because of the 
"special expertise" clause of NEPA,1 9 which applies to potential 
agency commentators, university academics have been given high 
legitimacy as commentators, even when they neither have legal stand­
ing nor are part of the responsible official's preexisting clientele. 
Social scientists are thus afforded access to a researchable process as 
participants. In this regard EIS's have an important advantage over 
other forms of participant observation: participating in EIS processes 
allows for observation of many units of analysis. The authors, for 
example, in addition to reading several hundred EIS's, have actively 
participated in about 100 EIS processes. These EI S's included 
examples of almost all general types of agency action, involved 20 
different lead agencies, and included proposed actions located in 30 
states and nationwide. A further advantage of the participant obser­
vation approach is that it permits testing the margins of the system 
of activity under examination by pressing certain issue areas or sub­
jects to determine agency response.2 0 
EVALUATION OF SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 
CEQ guidelines and regulations of various agencies for preparing 
environmental impact statements have remained relatively general 
during the five years following NEPA. The process has not yet be­
come routinized to the point of being an exercise at filling in the 
blanks in some assessment matrix.2 1 As a result, there are substantial 
variations among agencies-and even among different units within 
agencies-in the factors which are routinely considered in EIS docu­
ments. There are exceptions to almost every generalization about the 
social science found in EIS's which will be presented below. But it 
seems clear that in view of the wide range of major federal actions 
for which EIS's are prepared, the social consequences actually con­
sidered and discussed in EIS's are limited. 
19. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(v) (1970).
20. This is somewhat similar to Dexter's recommendation to engage, while interviewing, 
elites. See L. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, ch. 6 (1970). 
21. Unfortunately, however, agencies seem to be attempting to develop and implement
standardized matrices. 
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Substantive Treatment of Social Impacts 
The primary deficiency of social impact assessment in EIS's is that 
the statements usually consider only one social consequence-the 
economic impact of the project. The socioeconomic impact section 
of the typical EIS is generally an assertion that economic benefits 
will be derived from the project, typically expressed as a claim that 
employment or gross regional income will increase as a result of a 
project or that the project is designed to meet some economic 
demand. The modal EIS treats economic benefits as the primary 
justification for a project. The typical EIS, in addition, makes an 
unelaborated assertion that economic impacts will be beneficial. In 
many cases these assertions are open to severe methodological criti­
cisms. Because of methodological difficulties, one must often treat 
these assertions as articles of faith, rather than the result of rational 
evaluation. 
Impacts of agency programs on status, cultural or ethnic sub­
groups, or on the human community as a system are rarely con­
sidered in EIS's. While economic discussions in EIS's may assert that 
some economic variable, such as employment, will increase as a result 
of the project, discussion of other social impacts is rarely as specific. 
It is common for EIS's to note that some social variable will be 
affected, but not to assert the directionality of the effect, much less 
the magnitude. Possible social impacts, if noted at all, are merely 
listed. Nor are the implications of change in some social variable 
likely to be discussed. For example, an EIS on a major energy devel­
opment may note that the project could double or treble the popula­
tion in the impacted county over a short period of time. Apart from 
the demographic calculation, the EIS is not likely to discuss the 
implications for governmental services, crime rates, residential dis­
placement, and changes in ways of life caused by industrialization. In 
fact, it is not uncommon for EIS's to attempt to bury significant 
social issues. For example, a recent EIS discussed the impacts of the 
proposal on sacred-and secret-Indian tribal religious lands under 
the heading "wilderness," rather than as a cultural or religious 
issue.2 2 
There are two minor exceptions to the pattern of non treatment of 
social impact other than economics. Environmental statements by 
law must discuss two types of impacts which fall within a broad 
definition of social science. They must identify whether or not the 
22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Southwestern Region, Carson
National Forest, Taos Ski Valley, Draft Environmental Statement, at 66 (April 1974). The 
proposed ski area would increase access to the Wheeler Peak Wilderness Area and the 
adjacent Taos Pueblo sacred Blue Lake area. 
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project or proposal will affect either designated historic sites or iden­
tified archeological sites.2 3 
EIS's give inadequate treatment to problems of social impact in a 
number of other ways. Environmental statements usually propose 
ameliorative strategies to reduce negative impacts of the project. 
Hydroelectric power projects, for example, typically must provide 
new wildlife habitats or parkland to replace the habitat or parkland 
inundated by the dam's storage reservoir, Forest Service timber sale 
EIS's typically state that landscape architects will be consulted to 
minimize the aesthetic impacts of logging cuts, and projects with 
effects on air and water quality often propose ameliorative programs. 
However, the authors are aware of no EIS which proposes a mitiga­
tion strategy for a social impact and of only one EIS which even 
hinted at an ameliorative program for a social impact. (In a recent ski 
area EIS the Forest Service proposed that the developer provide 
group plans for lower-income recreationists. 2 4 ) Some energy devel­
opment EIS's still in process may become exceptions to this gener­
alization. 
Methodological Deficiencies of Social Impact Analyses 
The major methodological problem of EIS's is that the method­
ologies used to arrive at assertions in EIS's are often crude or bla­
tantly inappropriate. For example, an EIS prepared on a proposed 
scenic highway in northern New Mexico alleged economic benefits 
just marginally exceeding the cost of the road.2 5 The Economic 
Development Administration (EDA), the lead agency, calculated the 
anticipated economic benefits from two sources. First, EDA sur­
veyed local merchants to estimate the increase in business they might 
receive, generalizing from a five per cent response to a mail question­
naire. Second, EDA multiplied the standard daily tourist expenditure 
by the design capacity of the road. The road's ostensible purpose was 
23. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § § 470-470(m) (1970),
as amended, 16 U.S.C. § § 470(h), 470(i), 470(1)-470(n) (Supp. Ill, 1973) and § 470(h) 
(Supp. IX, 1974); Executive Order 11593, 3 C.F.R. at 154 (1971); and the Moss-Bennett 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § § 469-469(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
24. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, California Region, Sequoia National
Forest, Mineral King Recreation Development, Draft Environmental Statement, at 188 
(December 1974). Because of the high cost of travel, lodging, equipment purchase or rental, 
and lift tickets, downhill skiing tends to be an upper-middle-class form of recreation. Thus 
government provision of land for ski areas could be considered to differentially benefit 
upper-income groups. 
25. U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Proposed
Construction of Road, San Miguel County, New Mexico, Final Environmental Statement 
(Washington, D.C., July 17, 1973). The popular name of the issue is the "Elk Mountain 
Road." 
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to stimulate regional economic development. Apart from other prob­
lems, it was clear that few tourists would come to the region solely 
to drive the short but scenic road. Thus increased tourist travel 
would represent only shifts to the proposed road from other scenic 
roads in the region. In another case the Forest Service, calculating 
demand for a proposed development, made an arithmetic error which 
had the effect of overstating demand by 600 per cent.2 6 The correct 
demand was far below the proposed level of development. 
While the EDA's methods and the Forest Service's arithmetic in 
the above examples were cruder than usual, in one respect the dis­
cussion of economic impact was more complete than is customary. 
In these cases the basic methodology used in arriving at assertions of 
economic benefit was at least discernible; usually the basis for cal­
culations about economic or other impacts is omitted, which makes 
the figures presented difficult or impossible to evaluate. Corps of 
Engineers calculations of recreational demand for impounded water­
often a critical component of cost-benefit calculations-are represen­
tative of this problem. The Corps has relatively sophisticated 
methods for deriving an estimate of recreational demand based on a 
"most similar other project" design. This design makes assumptions 
which may be inappropriate for a given project, but characteristically 
the EIS will present the calculated demand without reference to how 
it was calculated, and internal calculations or consultants' reports 
will be unavailable. Because of repeated experience with gross meth­
odological errors, the authors view calculations of social impacts 
presented without reference to assumptions and methods to be of 
little scientific value. 
In addition to basic methodological errors, analyses of social 
impacts in EIS's have several epistemological difficulties. Social im­
pact assessment in EIS's is almost always devoid of any recognizable 
social theory and appears instead to be the result of agency hunches. 
Rarely do EIS's refer to relevant social science literature. The lack of 
references to social science literature is notable in contrast to refer­
ences to technical literature of the natural sciences. For example, 
extensive bibliographies and even bibliographic reviews on the use of 
some pesticide can be found in EIS's. Furthermore, almost no pri-
26. Mineral King Recreation Development, supra note 24, at 106-10. The error was that,
in accounting for market area demand met outside of the market area (for example, 33% 
who ski out of state), the EIS did not subtract one third of estimated market demand, but 
one third of market demand, less existing supply. This resulted in overestimating net 
demand by 600 percent for the higher of two total market demand estimates, and by 
13,120 percent for the lower estimate. See, letter from Paul J. Culhane to Douglas R. Leisz, 
Regional Forester, March 17, 1975, at 1-2, and letter from Michael McCloskey, Sierra Club, 
to Douglas R. Leisz, Regional Forester, March 31, 1975, at 12-14. 
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mary social research is conducted in preparing EIS's for programs 
likely to have major social impacts. In contrast, it is common to find 
natural science studies reported in EIS's which were conducted 
specifically for a project or which are very closely related to the 
project. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR INADEQUATE TREATMENT OF 
SOCIAL IMP ACT ASSESSMENT 
There are a number of good reasons for the inadequate treatment 
of social impacts in EIS's. In the first place, the EIS process, by 
common understanding, gives greater weight to impacts on air, water, 
land, and ecological systems than to impacts on social systems. While 
some sections of NEPA do recognize the importance of social im­
pact,2 7 this assessment has not been reinforced by emphasis in CEQ 
or agency guidelines, nor by court decisions.2 8 
Second, the backgrounds and inclinations of agency decision­
makers, staffs, EIS writers, and consultants are typically not in the 
social sciences, but in the natural sciences. Therefore, the key partici­
pants in the drafting of EIS's are frequently unaware and unapprecia­
tive of systematic social science. An interesting example of this bias 
against the social sciences among administrators is the following 
remark by an agency official about the social assessment conducted 
for the Northern Great Plains Resources Program study: 
A third work group is studying the social economic and cultural 
aspects [ of coal strip mining] . This group is endeavoring to find out 
what coal development will do to populations, incomes, local gov­
ernments, and cultural changes. They are looking into an assortment 
of changes that could take place socially. They are worried about 
people working in Decker and living in Sheridan that have to buy 
two license plates. They are also worried about whether newcomers 
commit different types of crimes than local people. I keep thinking 
really that they can answer most of their questions if they could just 
determine whether a cowboy can shovel coal.29 
2 7. See notes 13, 14, and 15, supra. 
28. Natural science impacts are given greater weight by default. The Environmental Law
Reporter, volumes I-present, does not present any cases in which social impacts were a 
major consideration in the decision of the court. Social impacts are not discussed in either 
of the two best sources on NEPA law: F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts (1973), or Federal 
Environmental Law (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). The only partial exception is the 
article by John M. Fowler, Protection of the Cultural Environment, id. at 1466-1517, which 
focuses on the protection of historic sites. 
29. Gibbs, Bureau of Reclamation, Remarks on the Northern Great Plains Resources
Program, in Bureau of Land Management, Montana State Advisory Board, Minutes 32 
(February 13-14, 1974). 
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Third, serious epistemological and methodological complexities 
often make it difficult or impossible for social scientists to give use­
ful or precise predictions of the likely social consequences of major 
projects. Rarely can all variables in a system but one be held constant 
in a real-life situation. If the researcher must assume that all factors 
but one remain constant to proceed with meaningful analysis, the 
result is often so transparently wrong as to make the impact evalua­
tion obviously inaccurate. Moreover, making such an assumption, 
and therefore omitting calculations of second-order impacts or the 
interactive impacts of a combination of developments, may lead to 
underestimating social consequences. Such underestimates may 
support the predilections of decisionmakers. 
While these formal problems (lack of legal reinforcement, lack of 
appreciation for social science, and epistemological difficulties) con­
tribute to inadequate social impact assessment in EIS's, the most 
fundamental problem is the approach of agencies to the EIS process. 
The EIS is written in the later stages of project planning and deci­
sionmaking. By the time an EIS is written agencies have devoted 
considerable resources to project planning. The pre-EIS planning 
represents a form of "sunk cost" to the agency, and for agencies like 
the Corps, with a ten-year planning to construction cycle, or the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic Energy 
Commission), with a six-year cycle, this sunk cost can be consider­
able. Further, by proposing a project the agency commits its prestige 
to it. These sunk costs, long recognized by environmentalist ob­
servers of agencies, invariably lead the agencies to adopt an advocacy 
position in the EIS document. Thus, social impacts that are discussed, 
i.e., economic benefits, are marshalled as project justification. If
negative social impacts are so obvious that they have to be acknowl­
edged, they will be understated or misstated so neither decision­
makers nor other readers can use the EIS properly to assess the
project's impacts. There are few exceptions to this pattern.
This adversarial, project justification approach to EIS writing is a 
general property of EIS's, not limited to considerations of social 
impacts. Agencies often attempt to find project benefits which are 
not apparent to other observers. For example, a Corps EIS several 
years ago noted that a dam which would inundate a pine grove would 
have the air quality benefit of eliminating "noxious emissions into 
the atmosphere" from conifers.3 0 
In addition, many of the most important social impacts of major 
federal actions are taboo subjects for written public documents such 
30. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, La Farge Lake, Kickapoo River,
Vernon County, Wisconsin, Draft Environmental Statement, at 11 (September 1971). 
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as EIS's, even though they may be important considerations in 
agency decisionmaking. Discussion of a measure's political ramifica­
tions and differential social impacts upon status, class, or cultural 
groups would violate the agencies' fundamental myth that their pro­
grams serve an undifferentiated public interest. It would be politi­
cally difficult for agencies publicly to debate the merits of providing 
positive values to one segment of society at the expense of another. 
An EIS on a major energy development in Utah might mention gen­
erally that the population would dcuble or triple, but could not be 
expected to say that this population growth would be likely to de­
crease the hegemony of the Mormon Church over almost all other 
social institutions in the area, or affect the pattern of rural Republi­
canism (unshaken since statehood). An EIS for a road that would 
open a previously undeveloped area in northern New Mexico, 3 1 
would almost certainly not discuss in any detail the possibility that 
ancillary developments would attract enough newcomers to create an 
Anglo majority in a previously Hispanic community, obviously an 
important social impact. Even if NEPA were meant to be an en­
vironmental full disclosure law, as Judge Eisele stated in his opinion 
on the Gilham Dam case,3 2 there are limits to the social impacts 
which are likely to be exposed in the environmental impact state­
ment. 
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE: NEPA AS A VITAL, 
EFFICACIOUS, POLITICAL, ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 
The scientific management analysis of EIS's leads to a very dis­
couraging evaluation of NEPA. However, such an evaluation signifi­
cantly understates the usefulness of NEPA and the EIS process. 
Perhaps the first and most important step in gaining a perspective on 
NEPA is to view the critical goal as improvement of the quality of 
decisions agencies make rather than improvement of the quality of 
environmental statements agencies write. While a good EIS may be 
associated with a subsequent decision which is socially and environ­
mentally sensitive, and EI S's on "environmentaf disasters" are almost 
always characterized by critics as inadequate, the final EIS and the 
final decision are quite different things. One need look no further 
than the first of the post-NEPA landmark cases for demonstration of 
this difference: the Calvert Cliffs decision required that an adequate 
EIS be prepared,3 3 but the nuclear power plant is now in operation. 
31. Proposed Construction of Road, San Miguel County, New Mexico, supra note 25. 
32. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'r. 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 
1971). 
33. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Similarly, opponents of a proposal consider it a victory when no final 
EIS is prepared because this indicates the proposal has been killed for 
the time being. However, even when a final EIS proposes essentially 
the same federal action proposed in the draft EIS, the process is by 
no means over. An EIS is a decision document, a report which 
accompanies a proposal through subsequent decision stages. It is not
a decision, but does provide an entry into the decisionmaking process 
and does create a number of new tools for advocates who wish to 
increase the environmental sensitivity of the decisionmakers. 
The EIS review process gives increased access to environmental, ad 
hoc community and public interest groups, particularly those groups 
which might not otherwise have close, informal access to decision­
makers. To illustrate the increased access of environmentalists under 
NEPA, Table 1 presents a comparison of comments received on 
almost all 1973 Forest Service EIS's with the distribution of contacts 
of a sample of 28 Forest Service district rangers during the same 
year. The table demonstrates a remarkable difference between the 
sources of EIS comments and of routine contacts with rangers. While 
consumptive users and other developmental interests account for 
two-thirds of ranger contacts (and almost four-fifths of all personal 
business contacts with the public), they provide only 17 percent of 
the comments on EIS's. On the other hand, environmentalists, con­
servationists, and preservationists-generally the agency's critics­
provide a quarter of EIS comments, though they account for only 
seven percent of the rangers' public contacts. 
The pro-environmental bias of access in the EIS process has, on 
occasion, allowed agencies to use the EIS to serve agency purposes. 
Agencies usually approach the EIS review from a project justification 
perspective and often view the preparation of EIS's, solicitation of 
comments, and revision and reissuance of the final statement as 
expensive, time consuming, and unnecessary formal requirements. 
However, EIS's have also been used to manipulate client groups, 
build coalitions, and otherwise generate support for programs or 
alternatives an agency wishes to pursue. The need to prepare an 
impact statement can often justify delaying a response to a demand 
from a powerful client, or even the agency's political superiors, when 
the demand or directive undermines agency values. While there are 
examples of several agencies which have used the EIS process in this 
way, the Forest Service has made particular use of this tool, success­
fully stimulating comments supporting some alternative to or modifi­
cation of a project proposed by a developer. This "compelled" the 
Forest Service to impose more stringent controls on the development 
Comments on Forest 
Service EIS'sa : 
Number of Comments 
% 
Public Contacts of 
District Rangersb:
Number of Persons 
% 
TABLE 1. 
Comparison of Interest Group Comments on Forest Service Environmental Impact 
Statements Versus Routine District Ranger Contacts, 1973 
Type of Group/Individual 
Environmental, Outdoor Consumptive Other Profess'[, 
Conservation & Recreationists Users, Boosters, ·(Ethnic, Scientific, 
Preservation (inclu. Ski Developers & Service, & Historical 
(inclu. Area Managers, Other Business Social, Ass'ns & 
Sportsmen) Outfitters, Firms Political, Individuals 
ORV Clubs) Media, Schools) 
153 18 101 14 103 
26.1% 3.1% 17.3% 2.4% 17.6% 
46 30 237 32 3 
13.1% 8.6% 67.7% 9.1% 0.9% 
Number of Interactions 413 285 4210 377 43 
% 7.7% 5.3% 7_8.9% 7.1% 0.8% 
Concerned Total 
Citizens 
196 585 
33.5% 100 
2 350 
0.6% 100 
7 5335 
0.1% 99.9c 
a) Source: H. Paul Friesema, Environmental Group Fragmentation and Administrative Decision Making, American Society for Public
Administration meeting paper, Chicago, April 197 5, p. 12. Data presented are the results of coding the effective universe of 1973 Forest
Service EIS's. Categories above·are combinations of Friesema's coding categories, as described id. at 7-9.
b) Source: P. Culhane, Land Management and Politics (forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston). Results are drawn
from a sample of 28 ranger districts on five National Forests in South Dakota, Utah, and New Mexico; data are rangers' contacts with key
people as reported in interviews conducted during the spring and summer 1973. "Number of persons" is the number of individuals or
organizations on a ranger's key person list; if persons appeared on more than one ranger's list-as was often the case-they were coded each
time. "Number of interactions" is the sum of the reported yearly contacts with the various key people.
c) Does not total 100 per cent due to roundoff error. ti: V, 
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than would have been possible in the absence of environmental 
"pressure." The Forest Service has done this by highlighting alterna­
tives or deficiencies in the draft EIS, prompting prospective com­
mentators, and employing a variety of other subtle and not so subtle 
techniques. In this manner the Forest Service has justified imposition 
of severe restrictions on access to mining sites in wilderness areas, 
land use controls on private land around developments, and limita­
tion of directed increases in timber harvesting. 
While the EIS process has increased access to decisionmakers, it 
does not guarantee effectiveness. To be effective in influencing 
agency decisions, an EIS comment can simply suggest an argument 
for or against an alternative. It is vital that the comment present a 
technically sound, detailed, and clear critique of the draft EIS. In 
this area professional and scientific commentators can play an impor­
tant role, emphasizing the importance of the high proportion of such 
commentators presented in Table 1. Agencies can, and frequently do, 
dismiss or give little weight to simple assertions of preferences, 
because they are seen as inappropriate comments on the merits of 
the decision rather than the EIS, 3 4 and because they violate the 
agencies' myths of rational decisionmaking and taboos against vote 
counting. 
There are a number of reasons why detailed, clear, and forcefully 
presented comments on an EIS can influence agency treatment of 
environmental and social concerns. First, the lead agency is typically 
cast in the role of a program advocate in an EIS. Thus the commen­
tator's effort is frequently to stop, delay, or modify a program to 
which the agency has made a commitment. It is easier to stop pro­
grams than it is to initiate positive programs. 
Delays are frequent in EIS preparation. Detailed critique:, of draft 
EIS's which force reconsideration of major points often delay initia­
tion of projects and occasionally lead to their cancellation. Several 
issues in which the authors have been active were resolved in this 
way. In one case, comments on the draft EIS for a weather modifica­
tion proposal required such detailed reevaluation that the season for 
the proposed weather modification was over before the final EIS 
34. See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, 2 Proposed Plan of
Mining and Reclamation, Big Sky Mine, Peabody Coal Company, Coal Lease M-15965, 
Colstrip, Montana, Final Environmental Statement, at 12-107 to 12-112 (Reston, Va., 
March 7, 1974), in which the agency explicitly chose to ignore the primary comments, 
replete with citations of law and regulations, of the Natural Resources Defense Council on 
the proposal (the "decision") as "not related to the environmental effects ... or alternatives 
to the proposed action." 
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could be prepared.3 5 In another case, during the time required to 
prepare several EIS's and defend litigation on a scenic highway 
proposal inflation increased the cost of the project so greatly that it 
was cancelled.3 6 The ability of sophisticated commentators to force 
delays can lead agency decisionmakers to respond positively to 
commentators rather than face the delay of constructing a detailed 
response to the comments. Delay is a particularly potent threat, of 
course, during a time of rapid inflation. 
While agencies may be constrained in the issues they voluntarily 
consider in EIS's (as noted in the previous section), commentators 
are under no such constraint. Commentators are not bound by 
agency taboos nor by the need for consistency from one EIS com­
ment to another. Commentators can ask any question, present any 
data or argument, offer any explanation, or suggest any alternative 
they wish, no matter how threatening to the agency. And the agency 
is mandated to consider such comments, at least formally.3 7 Because 
of the procedural complexities of NEPA agency resistance to good 
faith compliance with the Act and CEQ guidelines, it is still common 
to invoke legal sanctions for inadequate EIS's. This threat, which 
seems very real to agency decisionmakers, often compels them to 
treat detailed and intelligent comments with respect. 
A fundamental problem with the EIS process is that the agency 
which is responsible for a project (and thus often has a vested inter­
est in the project) is also responsible for preparing the impact state­
ment and responding to comments on the draft EIS. As Professor 
Reich noted more than a decade ago, environmental administration 
does not separate the functions of advocate and judge.3 8 It is not 
uncommon for agencies to ignore or misinterpret the detailed and 
apparently compelling comments they receive, leaving the substance 
of the final EIS essentially unchanged from the draft. However, the 
lead agency is often dependent on other units of government to carry 
out the project. Other units whose assent or financial participation 
35. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bonneville Power Administration, Hungry House
Cloud Seeding Program, Final Environmental Statement (Portland, December 17, 1973). 
36. Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M. 1971); U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Forest Service, Region 3, Proposal to Construct the Elk Mountain Road by 
San Miguel County, Final Environmental Statement (Albuquerque, June 17, 1971); Upper 
Pecos Association v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971); Proposed Construction of 
Road, San Miguel County, New Mexico, supra note 25; Upper Pecos Association v. Peterson, 
380 F. Supp. 191 (D.N.M. 1973); and Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 500 F.2d 17 (10th 
Cir. 1974). 
37. Council on Environmental Quality, Guidelines for Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.10 (1975). 
38. Reich, Bureaucracy and the Forests, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
Occasional Paper, 1962; reprinted 8 Center Magazine 51, 56 (No. 1 1975). 
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and approval may be necessary include the Office of Management 
and Budget, CEQ, appropriations committees of Congress, other 
federal agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, and state and local 
governments. The comments in an EIS can become the public record 
upon which these other units of government base their decisions, as 
well as a legitimate basis upon which the commentator can make an 
appeal to another unit of government. 
The authors' experience provides several examples of the impor­
tance of post-EIS appeals to other units of government. In one case, 
the Soil Conservation Service was not impressed by comments that a 
small watershed project would cause inadequate water flow in a trout 
stream. However, it was necessary for the project sponsors to obtain 
a right-of-way permit from the Bureau of Land Management. The 
BLM was more appreciative of comments about stream flow and 
made issuance of the permit conditional upon maintenance of the 
trout fishery, causing the project to be cancelled. 3 9 The Elk Moun­
tain Road project in New Mexico4 0 was ultimately cancelled when 
the state governor and Board of Finance, in response to environ­
mental criticism which the lead agency, EDA, had ignored, refused to 
commit additional state matching funds to cover the inflationary rise 
in the cost of the project.4 1 The Oakley Dam-Allerton Park issue is 
older than many of the current participants in the struggle. After the 
Corps issued an EIS on the project, many of the comments were 
directed not at changing the minds of Corps decisionmakers, but at 
pressuring the State of Illinois into withdrawing local support, thus 
forcing cancellation of the project. Recently, Senator Charles Percy 
(R-Ill.), in response to a critical General Accounting Office report 
which he had requested, began congressional action to revoke autho­
rization for the project. The University of Illinois Board of Trustees, 
which holds the threatened Allerton Park in trust, and the Illinois 
Governor withdrew local support, causing the Corps to abandon the 
project.4 2 Because of delays in preparing the final EIS on the 
39. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Georgetown Creek Water­
shed Project, Bear Lake County, Idaho, Final Environmental Statement (Boise, February 
1973). 
40. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
41. Letter from Governor Jerry Apodaca to H. Paul Friesema, February 11, 1975; see
also, notes 24 and 35 supra. 
42. Shaw & Ingersoll, U. of/. Trustees Withdraw Support for Oakley Reservoir, Chicago
Sun-Times, Jan. 16, 1975, at 22; Changed Stand on Oakley: Percy, Chicago Tribune, April 
23, 1975, § 3, at 12, col. 1; and McManus, U.S. Kills Oakley Dam Project, Chicago Tribune, 
May 28, 1975, § 1, at 2, col. 2; cf U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District, William 
L. Springer Lake, Sangamon River, Illinois, Draft Environmental Statement (Chicago 1973);
Comptroller General of the U.S., Economic and Environmental Aspects of the Proposed
William L. Springer Project, Illinois, RED-75-363 (1975).
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weather modification project,4 3 the lead agency, the Bonneville 
Power Authority, would have needed to obtain a waiver of the 
normal 30-day, post-final EIS comment period to carry out the 
project. Because the comments submitted pointed out adverse 
environmental and social impacts, CEQ did not grant the waiver, and 
the project was cancelled. Thus, the final EIS is not the same as a 
final decision, but the EIS can serve as an entry into the full decision­
making process, and comments on EIS's can serve commentators' 
purposes throughout the process. 
Skill in articulating social and environmental concerns and in fol­
lowing those concerns through the full decisionmaking process can 
be quite effective. The authors estimate that agency decisions have 
been altered to some degree in approximately half the decisions in 
which they have participated. The quality of the impact statement 
documents themselves has rarely been altered. In fact, to the extent 
that the documents have been "improved," the decisions themselves 
are less likely to be altered. Professor Sax, in a recent evaluation of 
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, found that environ­
mentalists have won about 50 per cent of the litigation they initi­
ated, at an average cost of a little more than $2,000.44 Therefore, 
the preparation of skilled, detailed comments on EIS's and follow­
through on those comments is a relatively inexpensive, efficacious 
way to influence public policy. Environmental and conservation 
oriented individuals and groups and activist scientists and specialists 
can operate effectively under these ground rules with few resources 
other than skill and perseverance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The continuing threat to agency programs and activities posed by 
environmental and citizen groups using the NEPA process and the 
courts has caused agencies to move, in varying degrees, toward orga­
nizational changes which go beyond discrete decisions. These 
changes, which increase the probability that environmental and 
public interest values will be important considerations in the deci­
sionmaking process, include: (1) increasing emphasis on public 
participation programs, particularly on developing more predictable 
and beneficial informal ties with critics4 5 ; (2) internally differen­
tiating agency staff by hiring individuals with broader disciplinary 
43. Hungry Horse Cloud Seeding Program, supra note 35. 
44. Sax & DiMento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years Experience under the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 Ecology L. Q. l, 8, 51 (1974). 
45. Federal Agency Organizational Change in Response to Environmentalism, 2 Humbolt
J. of Soc. Relations 33, 33-35 (1974).
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and professional backgrounds who share at least some of the values 
of the agencies' environmental critics, thus internalizing divergent 
points of view and altering agency values4 6 ; and (3) anticipating
possible adverse environmental and citizen objections and intro­
ducing ameliorative measures in agency proposals and projects, even 
rejecting certain proposals before they have a chance to surface 
publicly .4 7 
These organizational changes in agency behavior reflect the impor­
tance of the EIS process as a means of opening up agency decision­
making processes and counteracting the closed agency pattern 
described by Professor Reich by giving citizens, environmentalists, 
and professional evaluators access to the policy process.4 8 To be 
effective, however, commentators must recognize that preparation of 
the EIS is not primarily a scientific, rational decisionmaking process. 
Even while criticizing the logical and technical inadequacies of par­
ticular environmental statements, commentators must recognize that 
the EIS process is adversarial and does not end with publication of a 
final EIS. A comment on an EIS may provide access to a decision­
making process and be a valuable tool for affecting that process, but 
it is only a tool.49 
This article has argued that NEPA and the EIS process have been 
effective in bringing environmental pressures to bear on agency 
decisionmaking. In one sense, however, this evaluation of the EIS 
process is not completely positive. The beneficial effects of NEPA
appear in many ways to be unintended consequences. Basically the 
EIS is not an integral part of the decisionmaking process leading to 
fundamental agency decisions, but a formal requirement prepared to 
support a predetermined decision. It seems indefensible to devote 
considerable agency resources to building multivolume records for 
such a purpose.5 0 Agencies can and should integrate environmental
46. Id. at 35-36.
47. This agency response is a classic example of Freidrick's "law of anticipated reac­
tions." See C. Freidrick, Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Development, 
ch. 1 (1937). 
48. Culhane, supra note 45, at 33.
49. Berry, Citizens Approach Government: The Strategies of Influence of Public Interest
Groups, Midwest Political Science Association meeting paper, 8-29 (Chicago, April 1974). 
Berry reports that hearing testimony (which is analogous to comments on EIS's) is viewed as 
necessary by public interest lobbyists, but that other tools (informal lobbying, Utigation, 
constituency pressure, etc.) are usually viewed as more effective. 
50. However, in Bureaucracy and the Forests, supra note 38, at 56, Professor Reich
argues that one of the deficiencies of administrative decisionmaking under broad congres­
sional delegations of authority is that administrators are never forced to justify their deci­
sions. The EIS requirement at least forces agency administrators to put the reasons for their 
proposals in writing. 
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analysis into their basic project planning. There are sufficient illustra­
tions of how EIS's can be integrated into project planning, as CEQ 
has noted with regard to the Forest Service land use planning 
process.5 1 
The difficulty with earlier integration of the EIS into the decision 
process is that agencies are loath to make proposals public before all 
anticipated problems have been solved. They are, in short, unwilling 
to appear foolish in public. However, the time and effort necessary 
to mitigate problems represents an investment of personnel resources 
and agency prestige. This investment often makes it difficult for the 
agency seriously to evaluate an EIS comment or other pressures for 
cancellation or serious alteration of a proposed agency action. There 
is an inherent organizational contradiction in requiring agencies to 
prepare EIS's, which are thorough evaluations of a project, while also 
demanding that EIS's be publicly reviewed before agencies have 
become committed to the project. 
It is difficult to disagree with the statement that EIS's ought to be 
integrated into the decisionmaking process and basic project plan­
ning. However, this article has been concerned with a different issue. 
EIS's may have a less than optimal impact on internal agency deci­
sionmaking, but they do provide a basis for exerting effective ex­
ternal pressure on the agencies. The difference between the evalua­
tive conclusions based on a rational decisionmaking perspective and 
those based on an adversarial perspective seems to account for the 
apparently inconsistent pattern which leads environmentalists to 
deplore the ineffectiveness of NEPA, but to react vigorously against 
any attempt to weaken or restrict its applicability. NEPA may not 
force agencies to become optimizing decisionmakers with fully 
internalized environmental values, but it does provide the means to 
enforce environmental accountability on the agencies. 
51. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality-1974, at 378-81 (1974).
